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QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
WHETHER CERTIORARI SHOULD BE GRANTED TO REVIEW 
A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS DETERMINING 
THAT THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT AS TO 
THE LOCATION OF THE PARTIES' COMMON BOUNDARY 
LINE WERE SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
OPINION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
The opinion of the Court of Appeals is contained at 61 
Utah Adv. Rep. 33, a copy of which is attached as Exhibit "A" 
in the addendum to the Petition for Writ of Certiorari (herein-
after the "Petition"). 
JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
Respondents do not dispute this Court's jurisdiction 
over the Petition under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2 (1953 as 
amended). The decision of the Court of Appeals was entered 
July 6, 1987. 
CONTROLLING RULES 
RULE 43. CONSIDERATIONS GOVERNING REVIEW OF 
CERTIORARI 
Review by a writ of certiorari is not a 
matter of right, but of judicial discretion, 
and will be granted only when there are 
special and important reasons therefor. The 
following, while neither controlling nor 
wholly measuring the Court's discretion, 
indicate the character of reasons that will 
be considered: 
(1) When a panel of the Court of Appeals 
has rendered a decision in conflict with a 
decision of another panel of the Court of 
Appeals on the same issue of law; 
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(2) When a panel of the Court of Appeals 
has decided a question of state or federal 
law in a way that is in conflict with a 
decision of this Court; 
(3) When a panel of the Court of Appeals 
has rendered a decision that has so far 
departed from the accepted and usual course 
of judicial proceedings or has so far sanc-
tioned such a departure by a lower court as 
to call for an exercise of this Court's 
power of supervision; or 
(4) When the Court of Appeals has decided 
an important question of municipal, state, 
or federal law which has not been, but 
should be settled by this Court. 
Rule 43, R. Utah S. Ct. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff Hatanaka (respondent in this appeal) does 
not dispute the Statement of the Case contained in the Peti-
tion. However, plaintiff also points out that in addition to 
determining the location of the parties' common boundary line 
and finding a trespass by defendants Struhs, the trial court 
ordered defendants to remove dirt, debris and a fence placed by 
defendants on plaintiff's property and permanently enjoined 
defendants from trespassing in the future. In addition to 
affirming that portion of the Judgment, the Court of Appeals 
also affirmed the decision of the trial court not to award 
punitive damages, or attorneys1 fees pursuant to Utah Code Ann, 
§ 78-27-56 (1953 as amended). The Court of Appeals reversed an 
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award of certain survey costs to plaintiff. Although plaintiff 
had cross-appealed on the issues of punitive damages and attor-
neys' fees, plaintiff is not filing a cross-petition for certi-
orari. This case was heard by the Court of Appeals pursuant to 
transfer by this Court, exercising its "pour over" authority 
under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4) (1953 as amended) and Rule 4A, 
R. Utah S. Ct. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Statement of Facts contained in the Petition 
ignores the survey evidence relied upon by the trial court in 
determining the location of the parties1 common boundary line. 
This survey evidence, which is set forth in detail in the dis-
trict court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law ("Find-
ings and Conclusions") appended as Exhibit "D" to the Petition, 
was also relied upon by the Court of Appeals in affirming the 
lower court judgment. 
As set forth in the opinion of the Court of Appeals at 
61 Utah Adv. Rep. 33, both the Little Mountain Subdivision No. 
2 (Little Mountain), which is at issue in this case, and the 
Killyons Subdivision (Killyons), lying to the north of Little 
Mountain in the Emigration Canyon area of Salt Lake County, 
were platted by E. G. Swenson in 1909-1910. Although Swenson 
was the County Surveyor at the time, both of these recorded 
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subdivision plats were based on private surveys conducted by 
Swenson. According to Swenson's plats, he identified the 
beginning point of Little Mountain as the southwest corner of 
Section 27, and the beginning point of Killyons as the north-
west corner of the same section. Findings, 1f 1. 
The official survey of Section 27 by the U.S. Bureau 
of Land Management (BLM) was done in 1881, prior to the Swenson 
survey, and the field notes from the BLM survey were admitted 
into evidence at trial, as were the field notes of a Utah 
Department of Transportation (UDOT) survey of Emigration Canyon 
done between 1932 and 1936. Although the BLM field notes indi-
cate that a sandstone monument was placed at the Southwest 
corner of Section 27, the Swenson plats do not refer to that 
monument, and no survey conducted subsequent to the BLM survey 
has been able to locate this monument. However, the UDOT field 
notes incorporate the BLM field notes. Findings, 1f1f 1, 5, 10, 
11. 
At some unknown time prior to the UDOT survey, the 
Salt Lake County Surveyor placed a cedar post as the location 
of the southwest corner of Section 27. However, all parties 
and the current Salt Lake County Surveyor agree that this post 
does not accurately identify either the southwest corner of 
Section 27 or the beginning point of Little Mountain. Because 
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the cedar post is not an accurate control point, surveys of the 
Little Mountain area have had to use another control point. 
The control point that has been used at least as early as the 
UDOT survey is a steel pipe, which has been found to be located 
at the northwest corner of Lot 25 in Little Mountain. Although 
the origin of the steel pipe is unknown, use of the steel pipe 
as a control point for the northwest corner of Lot 25 in Little 
Mountain is consistent with McallsM or distances from other 
landmarks identified in the BLM survey, the Swenson Little 
Mountain plat and the UDOT survey. Findings, 1f1f 7, 11, 13, 14, 
17. 
The UDOT survey was unable to locate the sandstone 
monument identified in the BLM survey. However, by using the 
BLM field notes and the procedures for locating obliterated 
monuments, the UDOT survey was able to locate the beginning 
point of Little Mountain and was able to determine that the 
steel pipe was located at the northwest corner of Lot 25 in 
Little Mountain. UDOT relied on its survey in condemning pro-
perty in Little Mountain for right of way purposes, and numer-
ous deeds of property in Little Mountain (including deeds to 
and from Salt Lake County in the 1940s and 1950s) used the 
steel pipe as a control point marking the location of the 
northwest corner of Lot 25. Findings, 1f1f 13, 14, 16, 17, 21. 
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Use of the steel pipe as such a control point is con-
sistent with the "fit" of existing natural and man made land-
marks in Little Mountain, including the location of the road-
way, creek and various homes and fencelines. Accordingly, the 
steel pipe has been used as a marker for surveys in Little 
Mountain for over 45 years, including surveys performed by such 
firms as Bush & Gudgell, Coon, King & Knowlton, and Larsen and 
Malmquist for plaintiff Hatanaka and adjoining landowners in 
Little Mountain. Even a survey obtained by defendants Struhs 
in 1962 used the steel pipe as a control point, although when 
defendant Kenneth Struhs saw where the surveyor staked the 
property lines, he instructed the surveyor not to certify the 
survey. Findings, 1f1f 19, 20, 22, 27, 28. 
The later survey obtained by defendants for purposes 
of trial was uncertified and was inconsistent with all of the 
above survey evidence (including defendants' own 1962 survey) 
and inconsistent with the location of defendants' house as 
shown on their own building permit and proof of appropriation 
of water. Defendants' trial survey was based on the presumed 
beginning point of Killyons rather than Little Mountain, and on 
the assumption that the two subdivisions were contiguous. How-
ever, other evidence at trial showed that the two subdivisions 
are not contiguous. According to defendants' trial survey, 
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defendants' own home should be located in the middle of the 
road, and even under that survey, Struhs' fence and fill dirt 
intruded onto Hatanaka's property. Findings, 1f1f 31, 32, 33, 
34, 35, 36, 37. 
Accordingly, the trial court found that the survey 
relied upon by Struhs at trial was inaccurate, and the court 
determined the location of the parties' common boundary line 
consistent with the BLM field notes, the Swenson Little Moun-
tain plat, the UDOT survey and the rest of the above survey and 
other evidence tied to the use of the steel post as a proper 
control point marking the northwest corner of Lot 25. See, 
Findings and Conclusions, generally. 
ARGUMENT AGAINST ISSUANCE OF THE WRIT 
I. CERTIORARI SHOULD NOT BE GRANTED WHERE THE 
ONLY ISSUE IS THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE. 
Rule 43, R. Utah S. Ct., quoted above, provides that 
review by certiorari is not a matter of right but of discre-
tion, which will be exercised only in extremely limited circum-
stances, i.e. "when there are special and important reasons 
therefor." The Petition meets none of the illustrative cri-
teria for certiorari set forth in subdivisions (1) through (4) 
of Rule 43, and defendants offer no other "special" or 
"important" reason why they should be afforded an extra level 
of appellate review. 
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The Court of Appeals was created to streamline the 
appellate process in this State, which commonly had taken three 
years or more to complete in routine civil cases such as this, 
due to the overwhelming workload facing this Court. If certi-
orari is to be granted in cases like this one, where the only 
issue is the weight of the evidence, then not only will the 
purposes for the Court of Appeals be frustrated, but the appel-
late process will become even more cumbersome and time consum-
ing than it already was. Also, this Court's workload will 
remain unabated, and rather than focusing its attention on 
weighty issues of policy as intended, the Court will be rele-
gating itself to second guessing the error correction function 
of the Court of Appeals. 
The Court of Appeals performed its function well in 
this case. After carefully reviewing the survey evidence and 
applying the clearly erroneous standard of review to the Find-
ings of Fact (in light of the district court's unique opportun-
ity to determine witness credibility), the Court of Appeals 
determined that rather than being "clearly erroneous", the 
Findings were supported by the overwhelming weight of the cred-
ible evidence: 
In the instant case, the Findings of Fact 
were based on four days of trial and the 
testimony of thirteen witnesses. The criti-
cal Conclusion of Law delineating the common 
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boundary between the parties is based on the 
weight and credibility of the surveys found 
to be closest to what should be expected 
when the field notes of the BLM and UDOT 
surveys are consulted. Instead of being 
clearly erroneous, we believe that the Find-
ings of Fact flow logically from the testi-
mony presented and, therefore, will not be 
disturbed. 
Hatanaka v. Struhs, 61 Utah Adv. Rep. 33, at 33-34 (Ct. App. 
1987) (footnote omitted). 
II. DEFENDANTS1 ARGUMENT MISCHARACTERIZES 
THE ISSUE BEFORE THIS COURT. 
Defendants Struhs contend that the trial court erred 
in failing to relocate (or in failing to order the county sur-
veyor to relocate) the spot upon which the BLM surveyor erected 
a sandstone monument in 1881 to mark the southwest corner of 
Section 27. However, the issue is not where the BLM found the 
southwest corner of Section 27 to be in 1881, the issue is 
where E. G. Swenson commenced Little Mountain Subdivision No. 2 
pursuant to the subdivision plat he recorded in 1910. This is 
an issue of fact upon which neither the Court of Appeals nor 
this Court may substitute its judgment for that of the trial 
court. 
Contrary to the cases relied upon by defendants, their 
property rights do not flow from government patent or any other 
deed or grant of land referencing or incorporating either the 
sandstone monument or the BLM survey. Instead, these property 
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rights flow from the Swenson subdivision plat, which contains 
no mention of the sandstone monument or the 1881 BLM survey. 
While the BLM survey is not controlling, it is proba-
tive, because the Little Mountain Plat shows on its face that 
Swenson did attempt to locate the beginning point of the sub-
division in accordance with where the BLM field notes described 
the location of the southwest corner of Section 27. In this 
regard, all of the surveys relied upon by plaintiff also used 
the BLM field notes and recreated the BLM survey from those 
field notes, when the sandstone monument referenced in the BLM 
survey could not be found. 
In retracing the BLM survey from the field notes and 
thus relocating the southwest corner of Section 27, all of 
these surveyors discovered that the steel pipe was located at 
the northwest corner of Lot 25, as the lot and the subdivision 
had been platted by Swenson. Since the pipe could be tied to 
the southwest corner of Section 27 as shown on both the BLM 
survey and the Swenson plat, and since the BLM's sandstone 
monument could not be located, the pipe was appropriately used 
for a control point. Plaintiff's surveys were also consistent 
with the MfitM of other landmarks and improvements within the 
subdivision and were a proper basis for the trial court's deci-
sion fixing the location of the disputed boundary. 
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On the other hand, the survey relied upon by defen-
dants at trial ignored the BLM survey and field notes and was 
tied only to the location of a neighboring subdivision based on 
the mistaken belief that the two subdivisions were contiguous. 
Defendants' survey was also inconsistent with the "fit" of 
Little Mountain. Moreover, even defendants' survey showed that 
defendants1 fence and fill dirt were placed on plaintiff's 
property. 
The Petition is also incorrect in stating that the 
trial court determined the rights of non-parties. The trial 
court was called upon to determine only the property rights of 
the parties before it. This is not a quiet title action, and 
only the rights of plaintiff and defendants were fixed by the 
trial court's determination of the disputed boundary and of 
defendants' trespass. 
The three cases relied upon by defendants in attempt-
ing to argue [presumably under Rule 43(2), R. Utah S. Ct. ] that 
the Court of Appeals decision conflicts with prior decisions of 
this Court are: Barbizon of Utah, Inc. v. General Oil Co., 24 
Utah 2d 321, 471 P.2d 148 (1970); Washington Rock Co. v. Young, 
29 Utah 108, 80 P. 382 (1905); and Cornia v. Putnam, 26 Utah 2d 
354, 489 P.2d 1001 (1971). However, a review of these cases 
reveals that they actually support the decision of the Court of 
Appeals. 
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Defendants cite Barbizon and Washington Rock for the 
propositions that M[o]fficial government surveys cannot be 
changed in a dispute over boundary lines between individuals/1 
and that government surveys and section corner monuments are 
the "best evidence" in a private boundary dispute. See, Defen-
dants' Petition at 8-12. They rely on Cornia in arguing that 
the trial court failed to distinguish between whether the miss-
ing BLM monument at the southwest corner of Section 27 was 
"lost" or "obliterated." See, Defendants' Petition at 9, n.l. 
However, the reason this Court found the BLM surveys to be con-
trolling in resolving the private boundary disputes in these 
cases was that the sources of title of the respective parties 
involved were federal land patents based on BLM surveys. See, 
Barbizon at 471 P.2d 148 and Washington Rock at 80 P. 385. 
In the case at hand, the source of both plaintiff's 
and defendants' title is private deeds to numbered lots in a 
privately platted subdivision. Here, the recorded subdivision 
plat is the "original" survey, since it makes no reference to 
the BLM survey, other surveys, or any government monument. 
Defendants correctly point out that any rights created by 
"official" government surveys can not be altered by subsequent 
private surveys. By the same token, rights created by private 
surveys cannot be altered by inconsistent government surveys, 
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as the trial court ruled. See, Memorandum Decision at 22 
(appended as Exhibit MCM to defendants' Petition) and Conclu-
sions of Law, 1f 3. 
Thus, even if the county surveyor were to replace the 
missing BLM sandstone monument pursuant to § 17-23-9 Utah Code 
Ann. (1953), as defendants urge, this would have no effect on 
the rights of the parties under a subdivision plat not tied to 
that monument. Defendants concede as much in admitting that 
the cedar post currently used by the county surveyor to mark 
the southwest corner of Section 27 does not accurately reflect 
the beginning point of Little Mountain. See, Defendants* Peti-
tion at 7. 
If Swenson had used a commencement point different 
from where the BLM survey found the southwest corner of Section 
27 to be, the Swenson survey would still control, because the 
Swenson survey is the source of both plaintiff's and defen-
dants' title, not the BLM survey. The reason the trial court 
considered the BLM survey at all in this private boundary dis-
pute is that the evidence indicated that Swenson used the same 
"calls" (i.e., 5 chains from the road bisecting the subdivision 
and 6.5 chains from Emigration Creek) in locating the beginning 
point of his subdivision, as were used by the BLM surveyor in 
locating the southwest corner of Section 27. To this extent, 
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Barbizon, Cornia and Washington Rock become relevant in deter-
mining the probative value of the respective surveys relied 
upon by the parties here. However, the reason for this Court's 
rejection of the private surveys in those cases is because 
those surveys ignored the government's surveys and field notes. 
By contrast, here all of the surveys relied upon by 
plaintiff (including the UDOT survey performed in the 1930s) 
used or were consistent with the BLM survey and field notes, 
all of which were in turn ignored by the survey relied upon by 
defendants at trial. Defendants' cases establish the probative 
value of plaintiff's surveys and the lack of any probative 
value of defendants' own trial survey. 
Defendants' description of this Court's analysis in 
these cases of the "best evidence" of a government survey, and 
the distinction between "lost" government monuments and "obli-
terated" government monuments, is extremely misleading. In 
discussing the "best evidence" of a government survey, these 
cases refer to the best available evidence. If the government 
monuments have not been lost or obliterated then they are obvi-
ously the best evidence. However, all three of the cases make 
it very clear that if these monuments cannot be found, as here, 
then the BLM field notes become the "best" evidence. This is 
the evidence relied upon by plaintiff here and ignored by 
defendants. 
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Cornia also makes it clear that a governmental monu-
ment is "lost" rather than "obliterated" only if its original 
location cannot be found by use of the government surveyor's 
field notes. If the field notes enable the government survey 
to be re-created, then the monument is "obliterated" rather 
than "lost" and the procedure for relocation is simply to 
retrace the government survey from the field notes. The trial 
court here expressly found that the UDOT surveys, plaintiff's 
surveys introduced at trial and all other surveys relied upon 
by plaintiff followed or were consistent with the BLM survey 
and field notes. Accordingly, there is no merit to defendants' 
contentions that the trial court did not determine whether the 
monument at the southwest corner of Section 27 was "lost" or 
merely "obliterated," and that plaintiff's surveys were unable 
to locate this corner. 
The surveys plaintiff relies upon did not replace the 
obliterated monument because this is the job of the county 
surveyor under § 17-23-9 and because there was no need to do 
so. The steel pipe referred to in all of these surveys was 
tied both to the BLM survey and to the Swenson plat and was 
appropriate for use as a control point instead of the missing 
monument. 
There is nothing in any of the cases cited by defen-
dants to suggest that if the purpose for finding the location 
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of an obliterated government monument is to resolve a private 
boundary dispute, that only the county surveyor is empowered to 
perform this task under § 17-23-9. To the contrary, Barbizon, 
Cornia and Washington Rock all indicate that, as here, evidence 
of the original location of an obliterated government monument 
from private surveyors using original government field notes is 
the "best evidence" of government surveys, where the government 
surveys are used to find the location of private boundaries. 
Resolution of private boundary disputes cannot be made to 
depend upon the county surveyor's performance or nonperformance 
of § 17-23-9 public duties, especially where the private rights 
at issue flow from a privately platted subdivision, not from 
any public or government survey. 
Again, it was only defendants' trial survey which 
ignored the "best evidence" found in the BLM field notes and 
instead relied upon the false assumption that the Little Moun-
tain and Killyons subdivision boundaries were contiguous. It 
was only that survey that ignored the "fit" of all landmarks 
and improvements within Little Mountain, to the extent of 
shifting the location of defendants' own home into the platted 
road. Since even this survey conclusively establishes defen-
dants' trespass, there was no basis for the Court of Appeals to 
disturb the weight given to the evidence by the trial court. 
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CONCLUSION 
None of the extraordinary circumstances required by 
Rule 43 for grant of certiorari are present here. Despite 
defendants' attempts to mislead the district court, the Court 
of Appeals, and now this Court, as to the nature of the issues 
presented by this private boundary dispute, these issues are 
purely factual ones involving only the parties at bar. The 
Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the district court's 
Findings were mandated by the evidence, thereby conclusively 
resolving these factual issues. Plaintiff respectfully urges 
this Court to deny defendants' Petition for Writ of Certiorari. 
DATED this ^ Q day of August, 1987. 
'u 
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
^^,4PT7^^-
Jam^ rs A. Boevers 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and 
Respondent 
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